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Respecting Parents’ Fundamental Rights in the Adoption Process:
Parents Choosing Parents for their Children
Teri Dobbins Baxter*
Introduction
The Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently recognized parents’ fundamental right
to direct the upbringing of their children. This right is consistent with the presumption that parents
will act in the best interests of their children, and courts have cited parents’ fundamental rights in
holding that states must defer to the judgment of parents with respect to issues ranging from
education to religion. In the adoption context, courts and scholars have debated and discussed at
length the procedural due process rights of parents whose rights are involuntarily terminated, the
rights of alleged or presumed fathers of children born out of wedlock, stepparent and second parent
adoptions, the rights of de facto parents, and many other issues related to the rights of parents.
These are important issues that deserve serious consideration, but there is little precedent or
scholarly literature acknowledging that the fundamental right to control the care and custody of
their children includes the right to choose adoptive parents when the biological parents voluntarily
place a child for adoption.1
For some people, discussions of terminating parental rights brings to mind neglectful or
abusive parents whose children are taken into state custody for the children’s own protection.
However, many loving and competent parents make the difficult decision to place their children
for adoption; for those parents, the decision to voluntarily terminate their parental rights represents
a profound expression of love and a desire to give the child a stable and happy childhood.
Moreover, it is a concrete example of a parent making a decision regarding the care, custody, and
upbringing of the child. As such, it is a decision within the scope of the parent’s fundamental
constitutional rights. Consequently, states must recognize and respect the parent’s choice of
adoptive parents even if the choice is inconsistent with state or federal statutory priorities for
adoptive placements. Additionally, as a fundamental constitutional right, it trumps state and federal
laws—including the federal Indian Child Welfare Act—to the extent that those laws prevent
parents from choosing their child’s adoptive parents.2
This Article discusses the fundamental rights of parents under the United States
Constitution as recognized by the United States Supreme Court and lower federal and state courts,
and addresses how state and federal laws either vindicate or violate those rights in the context of
*
Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law; J.D. Duke University 1997. B.A. Duke University
1993. The author thanks the University of Tennessee College of Law faculty for their comments and at all stages of
this project. The author gives special thanks to Blair T. Chilton, Alexandria S. Hartill, and Rebecca L. Waddell for
their helpful and thorough research assistance.
1
Throughout this Article, I occasionally use the terms “birth parents” and “biological parents” interchangeably
to represent those who currently have legal status as parents and to distinguish them from prospective adoptive parents.
I use the terms only when necessary to avoid confusion and to be consistent with statutory language. Once an adoption
is finalized, the adoptive parents become the legal parents and have all of the rights and responsibilities that biological
parents have, including the right to choose adoptive parents in the event that they choose to voluntarily terminate their
parental rights and place the child for adoption. Consequently, when I refer to the constitutional rights of birth parents
or biological parents I include parents who have been granted a final decree of adoption.
2
Of course, the right is not absolute; the prospective adoptive parents must be qualified to adopt in accordance
with relevant state law. But the choice of the parent must be considered first and without regard to whether other
parties are willing or able to adopt the child.
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voluntary adoption placements. Part I examines Supreme Court precedent identifying and
exploring the contours of parents’ fundamental right to control the care, custody, and upbringing
of their children. Part II analyzes the rights of parents in the adoption context and argues that fit
parents who choose to voluntarily terminate their rights and consent to the adoption of their
children have a constitutional right to choose who will adopt and raise their children.
Part III examines adoption laws in California and Tennessee as contrasting examples of
state adoption law schemes and discusses how the statutory structure in each state succeeds or fails
to give due deference to parental choice in determining who may adopt their child. The discussion
includes recommendations for changes in the text or implementation of the laws when necessary
to protect parents’ rights. Part IV considers how the unique history and status of Native American
tribes led to the enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act and how its language can be interpreted
in a way that deprives parents of Indian children of their fundamental constitutional rights. It
concludes with a discussion of how the Indian Child Welfare Act should be interpreted and applied
to respect the rights of parents while still fulfilling the purpose of the statute and preventing the
further destruction of tribes and Native American culture.
I.

Recognized Rights of Parents Under the United States Constitution

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently held that parents have a
fundamental constitutional right to control the care, custody, and upbringing of their children. 3
This right was examined at length in Troxel v. Granville.4 In that case, the mother of two girls
challenged the constitutionality of a Washington State statute that allowed “[a]ny person” to
“petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody
proceedings.”5 The court could grant visitation to petitioners “when visitation may serve the best
interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances” and even if the
child was in the custody of a fit parent who objected to the visitation.6
The girls’ paternal grandparents filed a petition seeking an order granting increased
visitation beyond what had been allowed by the girls’ mother after their father’s death. The mother
wanted to limit the visits with the grandparents to one short visit per month; in their petition, the
grandparents requested two weekends of overnight visitation per month plus two weeks each
summer.7 The trial court found that the visitation would be in the children’s best interest and
granted the grandparents’ petition, ordering visitation one weekend per month, one week during
the summer, and four hours on the birthday of each grandparent.8 The court of appeals reversed
the trial court, holding that the grandparents lacked standing to petition for visitation under a proper
reading of the statute.9 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ ruling, but
based their holding on federal constitutional considerations. Specifically, it held that the statute
3

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
4
530 U.S. 57 (2000).
5
Id. at 61.
6
Id. The girls’ father never married their mother. After he and the mother separated, their father lived with his
parents and would regularly bring the girls to their home for weekend visits. Id. at 60. He committed suicide in 1993.
Id. After his death, their mother allowed regular visits with the paternal grandparents for several months, but later
sought to decrease the length and frequency of the visits. Id. at 60-61.
7
Id. at 61.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 62.
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violated parents’ fundamental right to rear their children.10 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and affirmed in a plurality decision that generated five separate opinions.11
The plurality acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects
against government infringement upon certain fundamental rights and interests.12 “The liberty
interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”13
The Court did not take issue with the subject matter of the statute, but criticized its failure to give
“special weight” to parents’ decisions with respect to their children’s best interests.14
[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. .
. . Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is
fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.15
The trial court erred by failing to accord special weight to the mother’s decision regarding
visitation with the grandparents.16 Instead, the judge presumed that visitation was in the best
interests of the children and placed the burden on the mother to show that such visits would be
harmful.17 The Court held that “the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the
fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes
a ‘better’ decision could be made.”18 Accordingly, the statute was held to be unconstitutional as
applied in that case.19
As Justice Thomas pointed out in his concurring opinion, the plurality opinion and Justice
Kennedy’s and Justice Souter’s concurrences all failed to “articulate the appropriate standard of
review.”20 Justice Thomas noted that the Court has held that parents’ right to direct the upbringing
of children is a fundamental right and he “would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of
fundamental rights. Here, the State of Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest—
to say nothing of a compelling one—in second-guessing a fit parent’s decision regarding visitation
with third parties.” 21
Even though he dissented from the holding in the case, Justice Stevens acknowledged that
“[o]ur cases leave no doubt that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in caring for and
guiding their children, and a corresponding privacy interest—absent exceptional circumstances—
in doing so without the undue interference of strangers to them and to their child.” 22 However,

10

Id. at 63.
Id.
12
Id. at 65.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 66.
15
Id. at 68.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 72.
19
Id. at 73.
20
Id. at 80. Notwithstanding the Court’s use of the term “fundamental liberty interests,” the plurality opinion did
not mention strict scrutiny (the heightened standard of review typically applied in cases alleging violations of
fundamental rights).
21
Id. at 80.
22
Id. at 87; see also id. at 95 (Justice Kennedy, dissenting) (“[T]here is a beginning point that commands general,
perhaps unanimous, agreement in our separate opinions: As our case law has developed, the custodial parent has a
11
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parents’ rights are not “absolute, but rather are limited by the existence of an actual, developed
relationship with a child, and are tied to the presence or absence of some embodiment of family.”23
Moreover, Justice Stevens believed that children’s liberty interests in “preserving established
familial or family-like bonds” should be recognized and considered alongside the interests of the
parents.24 In his view, the Washington statute merely gave individuals with whom the child may
have a relationship the right to ask the state to “act as arbiter” between the interests of the parents
and the best interests of the child.25 Justice Stevens thought it clear “that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment leaves room for States to consider the impact on a child of possibly
arbitrary parental decisions that neither serve nor are motivated by the best interests of the child.”26
By contrast, Justice Scalia viewed “the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children” as an unenumerated “unalienable Right” retained by the people which the Constitution’s
enumerated rights “shall not be construed to deny or disparage.”27 As such, Justice Scalia did not
believe that “the power which the Constitution confers upon [him] as a judge entitles [him] to
deny legal effect to laws that (in [his] view) infringe upon what is (in [his] view) that unenumerated
right.”28 While he would not overrule the cases finding a substantive constitutional right of parents
to direct the upbringing of their children, neither would he expand that right in the context of the
Troxel case.29
While there was no majority opinion, all of the opinions (including the dissents)
emphasized the child’s right to maintain relationships with third parties and noted the importance
of non-related third parties in the lives of many children. The justices may believe that the parent’s
interest is diminished in those circumstances, but that does not imply a belief that the state or other
sovereign (such as a Native American tribe) has a superior right to determine who should raise a
child. While some third parties should have standing to file an adoption petition as a general matter,
their petitions should be considered only if the parent’s choice is deemed unfit. “[I]f a fit parent’s
decision of the kind at issue [in Troxel] becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord
at least some special weight to the parent’s own determination.”30 Certainly a parent’s decision
regarding who should adopt her child is entitled to at least as much weight as a parent’s decision
regarding who should be able to visit the child.

constitutional right to determine, without undue interference by the state, how best to raise, nurture, and educate the
child.”).
23
Id. at 88.
24
Id. at 89. This is consistent with a “best interests of the child” component of the adoption process and does not
preclude recognition of parents’ rights.
25
Id. at 91.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 91 (quoting the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
28
Id. at 92 (emphasis in original).
29
Id. The Court did not address the question “whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation
statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation. We
do not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context.” Id. at
73.
30
Id. at 70.

4
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Parents’ constitutional rights in other contexts
Both before and after Troxel, much of the discussion of parents’ constitutional rights
focused on the rights of fathers of children born out of wedlock.31 In Stanley v. Illinois the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional rights of unwed fathers.32 In that case, an Illinois
statute made the children of unwed fathers wards of the state upon their mother’s death. 33
Consequently, even if the children’s father had acknowledged paternity, provided financial
support, and otherwise been a consistent, positive participant in their lives, unwed fathers were
presumed to be unfit parents (indeed, not truly parents at all) solely because they were not married
to their children’s mother.34
Peter Stanley, who had lived with his children and their mother for their entire lives, filed
suit alleging violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when the state removed the
children from his custody after their mother died and declared them wards of the state.35 The
Supreme Court held that failure to hold a hearing to determine Stanley’s fitness as a father before
removing his children from his care and placing them in state custody was a violation of his due
process rights.36 Moreover, denying him a hearing while allowing other parents whose children
are in their custody to have such a hearing violated his right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.37 In so holding, the court noted that it was “clear that, at the least,
Stanley’s interest in retaining custody of his children is cognizable and substantial.”38
A decade later, the court decided the case of Lehr v. Robertson and denied the equal
protection claim of a putative father when the state failed to give him notice of adoption
proceedings related to a child.39 Unlike the father in Stanley, the petitioner in Lehr had not
established paternity or developed a substantial relationship with the child.40 The court held that
“[i]f one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has
either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent
a state from according the two parents different legal rights.”41 Taken together, and in light of other
decisions on the subject, the Court has signaled a willingness to recognize and treat men as fathers
based on the relationship that the man has established with a child and not solely based on his legal
status or a legal finding of paternity. In the adoption context, this means that unwed fathers have

31

See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity: Evidence of the Biological
Mother’s Consent to the Biological Father’s Co-Parenting of Her Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 97 (2006) (exploring why
biological paternity has constitutional significance); David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional
Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 757 (1999) (examining legislative efforts to solve the legal
dilemma of biological fathers and proposing an alternate solution).
32
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
33
Id. at 646.
34
Id. at 646-47 (“we are faced with a dependency statute that empowers state officials to circumvent neglect
proceedings on the theory that an unwed father is not a ‘parent’ whose existing relationship with his children must be
considered”).
35
Id. at 646.
36
Id. at 649.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 652.
39
463 U.S. 248 (1983).
40
Id. at 267-268.
41
Id.
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rights that must be respected and their right to choose adoptive parents must be given deference as
well.42
Courts have also recognized the rights of de facto parents.43 In In re Parentage of L.B.,
Page Britain and Sue Ellen Carvin were living together in a romantic relationship and raised a
child together for the first six years of the child’s life.44 During that time Carvin shared parenting
responsibilities with Britain—the child’s biological mother—and was actively involved in her dayto-day care and the decisions regarding her schooling, discipline, and medical care.45 After the
relationship between Britain and Carvin ended, Britain refused to allow Carvin have any contact
with the child.46 Carvin filed a “petition for the establishment of parentage” which was dismissed
for lack of standing under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). The Court of Appeals reversed,
finding that Washington recognized de facto parents47 and holding that Carvin should be allowed
to present evidence in support of her petition to be recognized as a de facto parent.48 The
Washington Supreme court affirmed the court of appeals ruling.49

42
When the mother and father disagree on who should adopt their child, the question of how to resolve that
conflict can be complex. Clearly both choices should be considered and should be given preference over other
prospective adoptive parents, but how courts should choose between the requests of the mother and father is outside
of the scope of this Article. Instead, the analysis assumes that the parents are in agreement or that only one parent has
legal standing to consent or object to the adoption.
43
See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wash.2d 679 (2005) (holding that a woman who had co-parented a child
with her same-sex partner (the child’s biological mother) had standing to assert rights to visitation with the child after
the dissolution of the relationship between the woman and her former partner). At least a dozen states have recognized
the rights of de facto parents or persons acting in loco parentis to seek custody or visitation. Jeff Adkinson, Shifts in
the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM.L.Q. 1, 11 (2013).
44
In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wash.2d at 682.
45
Approximately five years into their relationship, Britain and Carvin decided together to conceive and raise a
child and Carvin was subsequently impregnated via artificial insemination. Id. at 684.
46
Id. at 685.
47
The court noted that the terms “de facto parent,” “in loco parentis,” and “psychological parent” are often used
interchangeably but are not legally equivalent. Id. at 692. The court adopted the following definitions:
In loco parentis: Latin for “‘in the place of a parent,’” this term is temporary by definition and ceases on
withdrawal of consent by the legal parent or parents. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed.2004).
While some legal responsibility often attaches to such a relationship, Washington courts and statutes have
never considered the same actual parents or akin to actual parents. See also In re Custody of Brown, 153
Wash.2d 646, 652, 105 P.3d 991 (2005) (noting “no Washington case recognizes that nonparents are
guaranteed the fundamental rights of parents under the doctrine of in loco parentis”). . . .
Psychological parent: Psychological parent is a term created primarily by social scientists but commonly
used in legal opinions and commentaries to describe a parent-like relationship which is “based ... on [the]
day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences” of the child and adult. JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD, ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
19 (1973). As such, it may define a biological parent, stepparent, or other person unrelated to the child. See
also BLACK’S, supra, at 1145 (“A person who, on a continuing and regular basis, provides for a child’s
emotional and physical needs.”). In Washington, psychological parents may have claims and standing above
other third parties, but those interests typically yield in the face of the rights and interests of a child’s legal
parents. See, e.g., In re Dependency of J.H., 117 Wash.2d 460, 469, 815 P.2d 1380 (1991). . . .
De facto parent: Literally meaning “parent in fact,” it is juxtaposed with a legally recognized parent.
BLACK’S, supra, at 448 (defining de facto as “[a]ctual; existing in fact; having effect even though not
formally or legally recognized”).
Id. at 692 note 7.
48
Id. at 686.
49
Id. at 683.
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In reaching its conclusion, the Washington Supreme Court noted that several other states
have recognized de facto parents in various contexts50 and that the statutory scheme in Washington
failed to address “all potential scenarios which may arise in the ever changing and evolving notion
of familial relations.” Consequently, it was appropriate to consider whether a common law right
existed even if the statutory scheme did not recognize de facto parents.51 The court held that
“[r]eason and common sense support recognizing the existence of de facto parents and according
them the rights and responsibilities which attach to parents in [Washington].”52 In order to be
recognized as a de facto parent, a petitioner must establish:
(1) the natural or legal parent consented to and fostered the parent-like relationship, (2) the
petitioner and the child lived together in the same household, (3) the petitioner assumed
obligations of parenthood without expectation of financial compensation, and (4) the
petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with
the child a bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature. In addition, recognition of a
de facto parent is “limited to those adults who have fully and completely undertaken a
permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life.”53
Crucially, the court held that de facto parents “stand in legal parity” with biological, adoptive, and
other legally recognized parents.54 As such, de facto parents’ choice of adoptive parents should be
given the same level of deference as other parents.
II.

Parents’ Constitutional Right to Choose Adoptive Parents for their Children

Given the Supreme Court’s recognition of parents’ fundamental rights with respect to
childrearing, courts should apply strict scrutiny to any law which disregards or overrules the
parents’ decision in these matters.55 Until termination, parents contemplating placing their children
for adoption are in possession all of the rights, obligations, and privileges enjoyed by all other
parents. The decision to place the child in the care, custody and control of particular prospective
adoptive parents is an exercise of their fundamental rights as parents.56 Consequently, any state
action denying a parent the right to make this choice should be deemed unconstitutional unless the
government can establish that doing so is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.57
The state will rarely be able to meet this burden. While the state certainly has a compelling interest
50

Id. 702-707 (discussing cases decided by the highest courts of Wisconsin and Massachusetts and citing to cases
from Maine, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Indiana, Colorado, New Mexico).
51
Id. at 706-07.
52
Id. at 707.
53
Id. at 708 (quoting C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME 43, 845 A.2d 1146, 1152) (internal citation omitted).
54
Id.
55
“A constitutional due process challenge based on an alleged infringement of this fundamental right requires the
court to apply a strict scrutiny test. The statute at issue must serve a compelling state interest, and it must be narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.” Punsly v. Ho, 87 Cal. App. 4th 1099, 1107, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 145 (2001).
56
See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (“the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”). The decision to terminate parental rights and
place the child for adoption should not be viewed as evidence that the birth parent is incapable or unwilling to act in
the child’s best interests. To the contrary, a parent’s voluntary decision to place a child for adoption is often a reflection
of the parent’s love and desire to help and protect their children. Thus, there is no justification for declining to
recognize their fundamental rights as parents or to recognize only diminished rights.
57
See Punsly, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 1107. Even if the parent’s interest in choosing the adoptive parent was a mere
liberty interest triggering rational basis scrutiny, the state has no legitimate interest in choosing the adoptive parents,
so long as the parents’ choice meets the state standards for adoption.

7
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in ensuring that adoptive parents are able to provide a safe, loving, and stable home for adopted
children, this can be accomplished by requiring all prospective adoptive parents to be evaluated
before the adoption is finalized.58 Allowing biological parents to choose adoptive parents subject
to court approval protects the state’s interest without violating parents’ constitutional rights.59
Birth parents may choose adoptive parents that are different than those who would receive
preference under state or federal law for many valid reasons. While a grandparent or other close
family member may meet the minimal standards for certification as a foster parent or approval as
an adoptive parent, the birth parent may have insights into those persons that the state and courts
do not have.60 For example, the family member might have an addiction, illness, anger
management problem, an abusive partner, history of financial mismanagement, racist beliefs, or
religious intolerance that is not known to those outside of the family and that might not be
discovered during a routine home study. That insight might lead the birth parent to conclude that
another person or couple would be a better choice to raise the birth parent’s child.
Allowing the birth parent to choose adoptive parents without having to justify that choice
also spares the parent from having to disclose sensitive or embarrassing information about
extended family members or others to the state in order to ensure that the child does not get placed
with unsuitable adoptive parents. If that decision will not be upheld, a biological parent may face
the unenviable choice of keeping the child and raising him or her in lamentable circumstances
(such as extreme poverty, violence or potential violence); giving the child up for adoption to be
raised by people unknown to the parent (and of whom the biological parent may not approve);
giving the child up for adoption to be raised by people known to the biological parent and of whom
the parent does not approve; or revealing the private struggles of family members to social workers
and court personnel in order to prevent them from successfully adopting the child. An exception
to policies requiring deference to parental choice may be made when the parent has committed a
crime or other circumstances indicate that the parent’s judgment is clearly suspect but their parental
rights have not yet been terminated. For example, a father who has murdered his child’s mother
and has been arrested should be entitled to less deference with respect to who should adopt his
children, even if his parental rights have not yet been terminated and his surrender is technically
voluntary.61
In addition, if the child is old enough to express an opinion, the child’s constitutional rights
should be recognized and her or his opinion given thoughtful consideration.62 While the Supreme
Court has never held that children have a constitutional right to choose or even have their opinions
heard in adoption proceedings, it has recognized the constitutional rights of children in other
contexts.63 In light of the fact that no decision is likely to have a greater impact on a child’s life
58
States would retain the power to reject the adoption petition of the prospective adoptive parents selected by the
birth parents, but only if they fail to meet criteria applicable to all prospective adoptive parents. In other words, the
petition may not be rejected simply because the court (or the state) believes other persons would be a better choice.
59
Even after formal termination, decisions made by the parent before those rights were terminated (at least with
respect to the choice of adoptive parent) should be viewed in the context of a parent’s constitutional rights.
60
See In re Adoption of B.G.J., 281 Kan. 552, 557-58 (2006) (birth mother “knew the background and parenting
skills of her extended family and she was adamant not to allow them to have placement of the Child” even though
mother’s tribe advocated for placement with those family members).
61
See In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d 772 (Tenn. 2010) (man who murdered his wife joined his parents in their
petition to adopt his child instead of the maternal grandparents (parents of the murdered wife)).
62
See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88-89 (Justice Stevens, dissenting) (noting that the Court has recognized the
constitutional rights of children in various contexts even though it has not yet elucidated the precise nature of a child’s
liberty interest in maintaining “family or family-like bonds”).
63
Id. at 89 note 8.
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than the selection of the person or persons who will raise, guide, and nurture the child, courts
should recognize the child’s liberty interest in participating in the selection process. However, their
limited perspective and experience counsels against giving them veto power or according them
deference equal to that of their parents.64 Balancing the constitutional rights of the parent and the
rights of the child can be accomplished without disregarding the parent’s choice or subordinating
it to the choice or judgment of the state.
III.

Current State Adoption Laws and Parents’ Right to Choose Adoptive Parents

State adoption laws vary widely and are often vague and confusing. Some only indirectly
respect the birth parents’ choice of adoptive parents. As such, they do not sufficiently protect
parents’ constitutional rights. If courts consistently and expressly recognized parents’
constitutional rights despite a lack of clear statutory directives, additional legislation would be
unnecessary. However, given the dearth of cases addressing these issues it is impossible to have
confidence that the all courts are consistently and adequately protecting parents’ rights. In fact,
many cases make it clear that courts do not adequately protect parents’ right to choose adoptive
parents for their children. The laws of Tennessee and California are discussed below to provide
contrasting examples that show the degree to which state statutes and regulations can directly and
indirectly affect a birth parent’s constitutional rights in the adoption context.
A. Tennessee Adoption Law
The law of Tennessee demonstrates how parents’ rights might not be fully protected. Title
36 of the Tennessee Code outlines the procedures for adopting a child. The statutory scheme allows
biological parents to choose adoptive parents by surrendering the child directly to the prospective
adoptive parents, thereby giving the prospective adoptive parents standing to petition to adopt the
child.65 However, it is less clear whether, and under what circumstances, the court can disregard
the wishes of the biological parents and allow other parties to petition to adopt the child.
Under Tennessee law, a biological parent may voluntarily surrender a child directly to
prospective adoptive parents, to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCS), or to a
licensed adoption agency.66 Prior to the surrender, the prospective adoptive parents must request a

This Court has on numerous occasions acknowledged that children are in many circumstances possessed of
constitutionally protected rights and liberties. See Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 600, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d
101 (1979) (liberty interest in avoiding involuntary confinement); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (“Constitutional rights do not mature and come
into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights”); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506–507, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (First Amendment right to political
speech); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (due process rights in criminal
proceedings).
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 89.
64
“Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions,
including their need for medical care or treatment. Parents can and must make those judgments.” Parham v. J. R., 442
U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
65
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-111
66
Id. § 36-1-111(c).
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home study from the agency, a clinical social worker, or DCS.67 The home study assesses the
physical, emotional, and financial health of prospective adoptive families as well as adequacy of
facilities, space, and safety of the residence.68 A court report must be prepared based on the home
study and that report must be reviewed by the court before the court may enter an order giving the
prospective adoptive parents guardianship of the child.69
The surrender must take place “in chambers before a judge of the chancery, circuit, or
juvenile court . . . and the court shall advise the person or persons surrendering the child of the
right of revocation of the surrender and time for the revocation and the procedure for such
revocation.”70 The surrender will not be valid unless the person or persons to whom the child is
surrendered have physical custody or the right to physical custody of the child at or within five
days after the surrender.71 The persons to whom the child is surrendered must file a copy of the
surrender with the court within fifteen (15) days after the surrender, and the court “shall enter such
other orders for the guardianship and supervision of the child. . . .”72
The statue further outlines the parties who have standing to petition to adopt a child.73
While the statute allows “[a]ny person over eighteen (18) years of age” to file a petition, “[t]he
petitioners must have physical custody or must demonstrate to the court that they have the right to
receive custody of the child sought to be adopted . . . unless they are filing an intervening petition
seeking to adopt the child.”74 Thus, under the statute, a party cannot petition to adopt a child if
they do not have custody or the right to custody. This effectively limits the class of persons who
can file an adoption petition. However, the mention of intervening petitions has caused confusion
regarding standing in adoption proceedings.
In In re Adoption of M.J.S., the Court of Appeals of Tennessee was asked to decide whether
an intervening petition for adoption could be filed by a party who did not have physical custody
or the right to receive custody of a child who had been validly surrendered by the biological mother
to a prospective adoptive mother.75 Langston, the prospective adoptive mother chosen by the
biological mother, filed a petition to adopt M.J.S. and the child’s maternal grandparents filed their
own adoption petition.76 After the two cases were consolidated, Langston filed a motion to dismiss
the grandparents’ petition.77 That motion was denied but the trial court later granted Langston’s
67
“’Home study’ means the product of a preparation process in which individuals or families are assessed by
themselves and the department or licensed child-placing agency, or a licensed clinical social worker as to their
suitability for adoption and their desires with regard to the child they wish to adopt. The home study shall conform to
the requirements set forth in the rules of the department and it becomes a written document that is used in the decision
to approve or deny a particular home for adoptive placement. The home study may be the basis on which the court
report recommends approval or denial to the court of the family as adoptive parents.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102
(26).
68
Tennessee Department of Children's Services home study process in DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY, Chapter 16.3 Desired Characteristics of Resource Parents, Chapter 16.4 Resource Home
Approval, available at www.tn.gov/youth/dcsguide/policies/hap16.htm.
69
Id. § 36-1-111(a)(2). There are separate provisions to govern situations in which the surrendering party resides
in a different state, foreign country, or is incarcerated in a state or federal penitentiary. Id. § 36-1-111(h)-(j).
70
Id. § 36-1-111(b).
71
Id. § 36-1-111(d).
72
Id. at § 36-1-111(q). Failure to obtain an order of guardianship must be entered within thirty (30) days after the
date of the surrender is grounds for removal of the child from the prospective adoptive parents. Id. § 36-1-111(u)(1).
73
Id. § 36-1-115.
74
Id. § 36-1-115(a).
75
44 S.W.3d 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
76
Id. at 46.
77
Id. at 47
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motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the petition, holding that the grandparents
lacked standing to file an “independent adoption petition.”78
The grandparents then filed a petition to intervene in Langston’s adoption proceeding and
Langston filed a motion to dismiss the intervening petition.79 The trial court ruled that the
grandparents lacked standing to petition for adoption, but instead of dismissing the intervening
petition, allowed the grandparents to participate in the proceedings for the limited purpose of
presenting evidence regarding the best interests of M.J.S. and Langston’s fitness as a parent. 80
Langston’s petition for adoption was ultimately granted and the grandparents appealed.81
The Court of Appeals first acknowledged that the statutory scheme gave biological parents
a qualified right to choose adoptive parents for their child.
Although a biological parent has the right to make the initial choice of his or her
child’s adoptive parent, the biological parent’s right to choose the child’s adoptive
parent is not absolute. . . . [T]he biological parent’s choice of an adoptive parent is
always subject to the trial court’s determination that the proposed adoption is in the
child’s best interests.82
The court went on to consider whether the Tennessee statutes governing adoptions allowed an
intervening petition when the biological parent has surrendered the child to a prospective adoptive
parent.
While the adoption statutes require physical custody or the right to receive physical custody
before a petition to adopt can be granted, the court held that the statutes allowed any party to file
an intervening petition for adoption.83
Although persons who file an intervening petition seeking to adopt a child need not
have physical custody or the right to receive custody of the child at the time they
file their petition, other provisions of the adoption statutes indicate that, in order to
prevail on their petition to adopt the child, the intervening petitioners must meet the
statutes’ custody requirement at some point in the adoption proceedings.84
Applying this analysis to the case, the court held that the grandparents had standing to file an
intervening petition,85 but did not meet the statutory requirements for adoption.86 Thus, their
petition could not be granted. While this interpretation might seem to make the right to intervene
meaningless, the court noted that if trial court had found by clear and convincing evidence that it
was in the child’s best interests, the court could have removed M.J.S. from Langston’s custody
and placed the child in the custody of any person, including the grandparents.87 At that point, the
grandparents would meet the statutory requirements for adoption and their petition could have
been granted.88

78

Id.
Id. at 48.
80
Id. at 48. The statutes specifically allowed any person to file a sworn complaint in an adoption proceeding for
the purpose of presenting evidence regarding the best interests of the child. Id. at 50 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 361-111(u)(2)).
81
Id. at 48.
82
Id. at 50.
83
Id. at 51 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-115(b)).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 52.
86
Id. at 53.
87
Id. at 55 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-111(v)(4)).
88
Id.
79
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The right to intervene was addressed later by the Tennessee Supreme Court in In re Sidney
J. In that case, the child’s father murdered her mother.90 The child’s maternal grandparents
immediately began caring for her and soon after petitioned for and were awarded temporary legal
custody.91 Almost two years later the maternal grandparents filed a petition to adopt Sidney.92 The
paternal grandparents filed an intervening adoption petition.93 The trial court granted the petition
to intervene and, after a comparative analysis to determine which placement would be in Sidney’s
best interests, granted the paternal grandparents’ adoption petition.94 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals held that trial court erred in granting the petition to adopt since the statute only allowed
parties with physical custody of the child to successfully petition for adoption and the paternal
grandparents never had physical custody or the right to physical custody of Sidney.95
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, noting that the language
referencing intervening petitions would be meaningless if no party were allowed to file an
intervening petition.96 Recognizing its duty to avoid statutory construction that renders any part
inoperative,97 the court concluded “that the trial court properly granted Sidney’s paternal
grandparents’ adoption petition even though Sidney was in the physical custody of her maternal
grandparents, the original petitioners, at the time the paternal grandparents filed their intervening
adoption petition.”98 The holding in Sidney J. can be read consistently with at least part of the
Court of Appeals’ decision in M.J.S. Both opinions held that § 36-1-115(b) allows intervening
petitions by parties who do not have physical custody of the child sought to be adopted. 99 However,
Sidney J. seems to have overruled the court in M.J.S. to the extent that it would require physical
custody or the right to physical custody before granting an intervening petition to adopt.
In subsequent cases, the Court of Appeals has held that the right to a comparative fitness
analysis found in Sidney J. does not exist in cases in which a guardianship had been granted to one
or more parties.100 Under Tennessee law, a guardian must consent to the child’s adoption.101
Consequently, if the guardian does not consent to adoption by the intervening party, their petition
to adopt cannot be granted and the intervening petition can properly be dismissed.102 While the
maternal grandparents in Sidney J. had been awarded temporary custody of the child, no party
(including the original petitioners) had guardianship status.103 Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court
did not address whether an intervening party’s petition to adopt could be granted over the objection
of a guardian without first terminating the guardianship.
89

89

313 S.W.3d 772, 773 (2010).
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 774.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 775.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 776.
99
See Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d at 776; In re M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d at 52.
100
See In re Don Juan J.H., 2011 WL 8201843 (Sept. 7, 2011) (holding that when guardianship has been granted
to DCS or any party, the guardianship must be terminated before any other party can adopt the child); In re Haily A.S.,
2012 WL 3090311 (same).
101
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113.
102
Don Juan J.H., at *3; Haily A.S., at *2. The Tennessee Supreme Court has not ruled on the propriety of this
interpretation.
103
See Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d at 773; Don Juan J.H., 2011 WL 8201843 at *3.
90
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This distinction between cases with and without guardianships was applied by the
Tennessee Court of Appeals in In re Don Juan J.H.104 The Thurmans were Don Juan J.H.’s foster
parents and the child had been in their custody for more than seven months when they filed a
petition to adopt him.105 At that time, DCS had been granted partial guardianship of Don Juan and
noted its approval of adoption by the Thurmans.106 The court granted the Thurmans’ motion for
partial guardianship soon after.107 The Riddles, who were Don Juan’s former foster parents (and
who had adopted one of Don Juan’s siblings) filed a motion to intervene in the adoption
proceedings, alleging that it was in Don Juan’s best interests to be adopted by the Riddles.108
DCS filed a motion to intervene in their capacity as partial guardians and stated that it
believed Don Juan should be adopted by the Thurmans.109 DCS further argued that unless the
guardianships of DCS and the Thurmans were terminated or DCS and the Thurmans consented to
adoption by the Riddles, the Riddles had no right to have their petition for adoption granted.110
The trial court heard evidence presented by the Riddles, Thurmans, and DCS and ruled that the
Riddles’ intervening petition “did not rise to the level of proof necessary to prevent adoption by
the Thurmans, and dismissed the intervening petition.” The Riddles appealed, relying on In re
Sidney J. and alleging that the trial court erred by not conducting a comparative fitness analysis
between them and the Thurmans before ruling on the competing adoption petitions.
The Court of Appeals distinguished Sidney J. on the grounds that “there was no indication
in Sidney that there had been any order of guardianship entered, so both sets of grandparents were
equally situated.”111 To the contrary, guardianship orders had been granted in favor of both DCS
and the Thurmans.112 Consequently, Tennessee adoption law granted them the right to consent to
adoptions and no other party’s adoption petition could be granted unless those guardianships were
terminated or the guardians consented.113 Since neither the Thurmans nor DCS consented to
adoption by the Riddles, and because their petition did not present evidence sufficient to terminate
the guardianships, the Riddles petition was properly dismissed.114
Right of Biological Parents to Choose Adoptive Parents in Tennessee
Tennessee courts have long held that parents have a fundamental right to the care and
custody of their children that is protected by the Tennessee Constitution and the United States
Constitution.115 Consequently, there is a presumption that “parental rights are superior to the rights
104

Don Juan J.H. at 2-3.
Id. at *1.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id at 1-2.
110
Id. at 2.
111
Id. at 3.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
“Parents, including parents of children born out of wedlock, have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and
custody of their children under both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions.” Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d
674, 678 (Tenn. 1994); see Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Tenn. 2002) (recognizing parents’ fundamental
rights and citing TENN. CONST. ART. I, § 8: “That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold,
liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property,
but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”).
105
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of others and continue without interruption unless a biological parent consents to relinquish them,
abandons his or her child, or forfeits his or her parental rights by some conduct that substantially
harms the child.”116 This recognition of “superior parental rights” has been applied in cases
involving initial custody disputes between a parent and non-parent.117
Procedural pitfalls
While Tennessee’s statutory scheme generally supports the biological parent’s right to
choose adoptive parents, a parent must be careful to follow the procedures set out in the statute to
ensure that the chosen prospective adoptive parents have the best chance of having their petition
to adopt granted. A biological parent who is not aware of the importance of surrendering the child
directly to the prospective adoptive parent may leave the child in the custody of a family member
or other person, with the intent of choosing another person or persons as adoptive parents.
However, without physical custody or the right to physical custody, the prospective adoptive
parents will not have standing to file a petition for adoption.118 They may file an intervening
petition if another party files a petition to adopt,119 but even then they will be subject to a
comparative fitness analysis with no statutory requirement that the court afford them special
weight as the biological parent’s choice.120 Moreover, if another party is granted guardianship, that
party must consent to the adoption and can choose to withhold that consent from the prospective
adoptive parents chosen by the biological parents.
Tennessee’s procedure fails to give adequate weight to the biological parent’s choice and
thereby violates their constitutional rights. As the plurality held in Troxel, when a fit parent’s
decision regarding the rearing of her child is at issue, “the court must accord at least some special
weight to the parent’s own determination.”121 A parent who is voluntarily surrendering her child
for adoption—and who has not been found negligent or abusive or otherwise unfit—is presumably
a fit parent whose opinion is entitled to deference and her choice of adoptive parent should not be
on equal footing with any other petitioner who seeks to adopt the child. Consequently, Tennessee
adoption statutes should be amended to require deference to the biological parents’ choice of
adoptive parents, notwithstanding statutory requirements of physical custody and the need for
consent by the guardian.
116

Blair, 77 S.W.3d at 141.
Id. However, this presumption does not generally apply when a parent seeks to modify a valid custody order
in favor of a non-parent.
[W]ith respect to custody modification issues, a natural parent enjoys the presumption of superior
rights under four circumstances: (1) when no order exists that transfers custody from the natural
parent; (2) when the order transferring custody from the natural parent is accomplished by fraud or
without notice to the parent; (3) when the order transferring custody from the natural parent is
invalid on its face; and (4) when the natural parent cedes only temporary and informal custody to
the non-parents. Consequently, when any of these circumstances are present in a given case, then
protection of the right of natural parents to have the care and custody of their children demands
that they be accorded a presumption of superior parental rights against claims of custody by nonparents.
Id. at 143.
118
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-115(a) (requiring custody or right to physical custody to have standing to file petition
for adoption)
119
See In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d at 776.
120
See id. (noting that the statutes do not provide guidance regarding a comparative fitness analysis).
121
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70.
117
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Right to revoke surrender
Tennessee law does provide some protection for parents who surrender their children and
consent to adoption. The statutes allow for revocation of the surrender or parental consent and
reinstatement of parental rights (with the consent of the parent) if consent is revoked within ten
days of the surrender and at any time before the court enters an order confirming parental consent
to adoption.122 At that point, the parent’s rights will be restored to the status prior to the surrender
or consent.123 After the time for revocation has passed, the parent’s rights are extremely limited
and the court will only allow the surrender to be revoked upon proof of fraud, duress, intentional
misrepresentation, or proof that the surrender was invalid.124 Moreover, no surrender or parental
consent can be set aside on these grounds unless an action to revoke is initiated within thirty days
of the surrender or order confirming parental consent to the adoption.125
If the parent does not revoke the surrender or consent to adoption but the court ultimately
decides not to approve the adoptive couple chosen by the biological parent, the biological parent
does not have an absolute right to reinstatement of parental rights or to custody of the child.126
If at any time between the surrender of a child directly to prospective adoptive
parents and the filing of an adoption petition or at any time between the filing of an
adoption petition and the issuance of the final order of the adoption, it is made
known to the court on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that circumstances
are such that the child should not be adopted, the court may dismiss the adoption
proceedings or, if no adoption proceedings have been commenced, the court may
order the surrender or parental consent to prospective adoptive parents to be
revoked and may modify or dismiss any order of guardianship previously entered,
and may order the reinstatement of parental rights, all in consideration of the best
interests of the child.127
But while the statute allows for reinstatement of parental rights, it does not require
reinstatement.128 Instead, the court may choose to place the child in the custody of DCS or a
licensed child-placing agency if it is deemed to be in the best interests of the child.129

122

TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-118(a), (d)(2). A person who executes a surrender may revoke the surrender within
ten calendar days of the date of the surrender. Id. at §§ 36-1-112(a). A parental consent may be revoked at any time
prior to the entry of an order of confirmation of the parental consent by the court. Id. § 36-1-112(a)(2)(A)
123
“A surrender or parental consent that is revoked shall have the effect of returning the child's legal status to that
which existed before the surrender was executed, and the department, a licensed child-placing agency, or the person
who or that had custody or guardianship of the child prior to the surrender pursuant to any parental status, prior court
order or statutory authorization shall continue or resume custody or guardianship under that prior parental status, prior
court order, or statutory authority, that had established the custodial or guardianship status of the child prior to the
execution of the surrender or parental consent, unless a court of competent jurisdiction shall otherwise determine as
specifically provided herein.” Id. § 36-1-112(e)(1).
124
Id. § 36-1-112(d).
125
Id.
126
See id. § 36-1-118(a); see also § 36-116(k) (allowing the court to make orders “for the welfare and protection
of the child,” including removal of the child from the custody of the prospective adoptive parents).
127
Id. § 36-1-118(a).
128
Id. § 36-1-118(a)-(d).
129
Id. § 36-1-118(e). Alternatively, the child may remain a ward of the court. Id.

15

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2496415

Draft--Forthcoming in Rutgers Law Review

If DCS or the child-placing agency is awarded guardianship, then it will have authority to
place the child for adoption and to consent to adoption of the child.130 Thus, the parent has no
opportunity to choose alternative adoptive parents. Moreover, it is unclear what circumstances
would justify a decision not to reinstate parental rights. Since the standard is simply “the best
interests of the child” the court seems to have broad discretion in making this decision. Terminating
the parental rights of a fit parent then refusing to reinstate those rights when the child is removed
from the custody of the chosen adoptive parents and refusing to allow the biological parents to
choose alternative parents is an unjust deprivation of their constitutional right as parents to
determine the custody, care, and upbringing of the child. At a minimum, the law should be
amended to require reinstatement of parental rights unless it is shown by clear and convincing
evidence that doing so would result in harm to the child.131 This heightened standard of proof is
appropriate in cases in which the parent voluntarily surrendered the child and there has been no
finding of abuse or neglect before or after the surrender. Moreover, absent some compelling
reason, biological parents should be allowed to choose alternate prospective adoptive parents if
the petition of their original choice is denied.
B. California Adoption Law
In California, a biological parent may choose an “agency adoption” or an “independent
adoption.”132 “Agency adoption” is defined as “the adoption of a minor, other than an intercountry
adoption, in which the department, county adoption agency, or licensed adoption agency is a party
to, or joins in, the adoption petition.”133 “Independent adoption” is “the adoption of a child in
which neither the department, county adoption agency, nor agency licensed by the department is
a party to, or joins in, the adoption petition.”134 California provides more options for parents
seeking to place their children for adoption and clearer guidelines and protections for parents who
wish to choose the adoptive parents for their children.
Agency Adoptions
The adoption agency serves as an agent of the state in agency adoptions. 135 One or both
biological parents relinquishes the child to a department, county agency, or licensed adoption
agency by signing a written statement “before two subscribing witnesses and acknowledged before
an authorized official [of the state department of social services].”136 Before accepting the
130

Id. § 36-1-118(6). But if the court grants legal custody without awarding guardianship, then the custodian does
not have authority to place the child for adoption or consent to an adoption.
131
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that procedural due process requires states to apply a
standard of proof equal to or greater than clear and convincing evidence before terminating parental rights).
132
CAL. FAM. CODE CHAPTER 2 (Agency Adoptions), Chapter 3 (Independent Adoptions).
133
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8506. A “licensed adoption agency” is “an agency licensed by the department to provide
adoption services.” Id. § 8530. “Department,” as used in the California Family Code, means the State Department of
Social Services. Id. § 8518.
134
Id. § 8524.
135
Tyler v. Children’s Home Society, 29 Cal. App. 4th 511, 545 (1994) (finding that licensed adoption agencies
are fairly characterized as agents of the state).
136
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8700. “Either birth parent may relinquish a child to the department, county adoption agency,
or licensed adoption agency for adoption by a written statement signed before two subscribing witnesses and
acknowledged before an authorized official of the department, county adoption agency, or licensed adoption agency.
“Id. at § 8700(a).
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relinquishment, the agency must advise the parents of their rights and the alternatives to
relinquishment, and must provide counseling to assist the parent in understanding their feelings
about relinquishment and adoption (including long term consequences) and to ensure that the
parent makes the decision to relinquish freely.137 “After accepting a relinquishment, the agency
shall provide additional counseling and referral services to the relinquishing parent as needed.”138
The relinquishment does not become effective until a certified copy of the relinquishment
statement is sent to and filed with the department.139 Before it becomes effective, it may be
withdrawn at the request of the birth parent.140 The relinquishment becomes final 10 business days
after receipt by the department or when the department sends written acknowledgment of receipt,
whichever is earlier.141 After it becomes final, the relinquishment may only be rescinded by “the
mutual consent of the department, county adoption agency, or licensed adoption agency to which
the child was relinquished and the birth parent or parents relinquishing the child.”142 If the agency
consents to the rescission, the child must be returned to the birth parent within seven working
days.143
The relinquishment terminates the birth parents’ rights and gives the agency full custody
and control of the child until the adoption is finalized.144 However, the relinquishing parents may
name the “person or persons with whom he or she intends that placement of the child for adoption
be made.”145 If the child is not placed with the persons named by the relinquishing parents, or if
the child is removed from the home of the named persons before the adoption is granted, then the
birth parents have the right to rescind the relinquishment.146 This right to rescind exists even if the
relinquishment previously became final.147
Once the birth parents have been given notice that the child was removed from the
prospective adoptive parents, the birth parent has thirty days to rescind the relinquishment.148 The
agency must return the child to the parent within seven working days after the request to rescind
was made.149 Alternatively, the relinquishing parent and the department or adoption agency can
137

CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 22, § 35129(a) (2014)
Id. § 35129(c).
139
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8700(e)(1).
140
Id. at § 8700(e)(1).
141
Id. The relinquishment will be final before 10 business days if the department sends written acknowledgment
of receipt or if the birth parent signs a waiver of the right to revoke the relinquishment. Id.
142
Id.
143
CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 22, § 35170
144
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8700(j), 8704.
145
Id. § 8700(f).
146
Id. § 8700(g).
147
Id. “Notwithstanding subdivision (e), if the relinquishment names the person or persons with whom placement
by the department, county adoption agency, or licensed adoption agency is intended and the child is not placed in the
home of the named person or persons or the child is removed from the home prior to the granting of the adoption, the
department, county adoption agency, or licensed adoption agency shall mail a notice by certified mail, return receipt
requested, to the birth parent signing the relinquishment within 72 hours of the decision not to place the child for
adoption or the decision to remove the child from the home.” Id. § 8700(g).
148
Id. § 8700(h). If the birth parent chooses to rescind, the department or adoption agency must rescind the
relinquishment. Id. at § 8700(h)(1).
149
“[T] he agency shall rescind the relinquishment of any parent who, having been notified as provided in Family
Code Section 8700(f), delivers, or has delivered by mail or other method, before the end of the 30-day period beginning
on the day after the notice was mailed a written request to the agency stating that he or she wishes to rescind his or
her relinquishment and/or have the child returned. . . . In all such cases, the agency shall . . . [m]utually agree with the
parent regarding the time and place for return of the child if the child is neither detained nor a juvenile court dependent
138
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identify new prospective adoptive parents.150 In that scenario, the initial relinquishment will be
rescinded and a new relinquishment statement will be completed identifying the new prospective
adoptive parent or parents.151 If the parent does not rescind, the department or adoption agency
will select new adoptive parents.152
The agency typically conducts a home study and places the child with the prospective
adoptive parents for a “test period” before the agency will consent to the adoption.153 If the agency
determines that the prospective adoption parents should not be allowed to adopt the child, the
agency can terminate the temporary placement and take physical custody of the child at the
agency’s discretion.154 At this point, the birth parents may exercise their right to rescind the
relinquishment.155 However, if the adoption petition has been filed, the child may only be removed
from the custody of the prospective adoptive parents with court approval.156 The agency can refuse
to consent to the adoption, but the court has authority to grant the adoption petition over the
agency’s objection if the court “finds that the refusal to consent is not in the child's best interest.”157
If the court refuses to remove the child from the home of the prospective parents, the birth
parents have no right to object to or prevent the adoption. However, the relinquishment can still
be rescinded if the agency consents to the rescission.158 In that circumstance, the birth parent is
entitled to have the child returned to her or his physical custody.159 At that point, the parent
resumes all rights and responsibilities enjoyed before the relinquishment and “the agency adoption
petition becomes a nullity because the adoption cannot proceed without the birth parent’s
consent.”160
Independent Adoptions
In an independent adoption, the birth parents place the child for adoption using an adoption
service provider.161 The birth parents (and not an agent) must personally select the prospective
in out-of-home care. . . . The agency shall return the child no later than seven working days from the time the request
to rescind is made.” CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 22, § 35170.
150
Id. §8700(h)(3).
151
Id. § 8700(h)(3).
152
Id. § 8700(h)(2).
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. § 8700(g).
156
Id. § 8704(b).
157
Id.
158
Id. § 8700(e)(2).
159
CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 22, § 35170; § 8700(e)(2); see also In re Michael R., 137 Cal. App. 4th 126, 143 (2006).
160
In re Michael R., 137 Cal. App. 4th at 143; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8704-8706.
161
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.3.
“Adoption service provider” means any of the following:
(1) A licensed private adoption agency.
(2) An individual who has presented satisfactory evidence to the department that he or she is a licensed
clinical social worker who also has a minimum of five years of experience providing professional social work
services while employed by a licensed California adoption agency or the department.
(3) In a state other than California, or a country other than the United States, an adoption agency licensed or
otherwise approved under the laws of that state or country, or an individual who is licensed or otherwise certified
as a clinical social worker under the laws of that state or country.
(4) An individual who has presented satisfactory evidence to the department that he or she is a licensed
marriage and family therapist who has a minimum of five years of experience providing professional adoption
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adoptive parents based on the birth parent’s “personal knowledge of the prospective adoptive
parent or parents.”162 Each birth parent, each prospective adoptive parent, and the adoption service
provider sign an adoption placement agreement, which must include a statement that the birth
parents have been advised of their rights (including notification of alternatives to adoption,
alternative types of adoption, the right to counseling and to separate legal counsel at the expense
of the prospective adoptive parents).163 The placement agreement must also include a statement
that the birth parents understand that they have the right to revoke the agreement within thirty days
after signing it, and that the agreement becomes a permanent and irrevocable consent to adoption
on the thirty-first day after signing the agreement.164
The thirty day window for revoking an adoption placement agreement in an independent
adoption is longer than the time frame allowed under agency adoptions. 165 To effectively revoke
the agreement, the birth parents must “[s]ign and deliver to the department or delegated county
adoption agency a written statement revoking the consent and requesting the child to be returned
to the birth parent or parents.”166 Within that thirty day window, “the birth parent or parents may
request return of the child. In such a case the child shall immediately be returned to the parent or
parents so requesting.”167 This right to regain physical custody of the child is unqualified. Even if
the person or persons with whom the child had been placed believe that the birth parents are unfit
or a danger to the child’s health or safety, those concerns are not grounds for refusing to
immediately return the child.168 Instead, their “only option is to report their concerns to the
investigating adoption agency and the appropriate child welfare agency.”169 This requirement
provides strong protection for parents who voluntarily relinquish their children for adoption.
Right of Biological Parents to Choose Adoptive Parent
California’s statutory scheme gives significant but not unlimited power to birth parents in
choosing adoptive parents. Both agency and independent adoptions give biological parents the
right initially to choose the prospective adoptive parents and the right to revoke consent to the
adoption, although the time frame for exercising the right to revoke differs. While agency
adoptions give parents a shorter and less predictable time frame for revocation, they have the
additional opportunity to rescind the relinquishment and regain custody if the child is not placed
with or is removed from the home of the chosen adoptive parents. In an independent adoption,
casework services while employed by a licensed California adoption agency or the department. The department
shall review the qualifications of each individual to determine if he or she has performed professional adoption
casework services for five years as required by this section while employed by a licensed California adoption
agency or the department.
Id. § 8502(a)
162
Id. § 8801(a). Agencies typically provide profiles of hopeful adoptive families which the birth parents can
review.
163
Id. §§ 8801.3(b), 8801.5. The birth parents must be advised of their rights at least ten days before the agreement
is signed. Id. § 8801.3(b)(1)
164
Id. §§ 8801.3(c), 8814.5(a). The birth parent(s) may file a waiver of the right to revoke under specified
circumstances. Id. at § 8814.5(a)(2). The right to revoke consent is terminated thirty days after signing the agreement
or after the waiver has been signed, whichever occurs first. § 8814.5(b).
165
See discussion infra and § 8700(e).
166
Id. § 8814.5(a)(1).
167
Id. 8815(b).
168
Id. § 8815(c).
169
Id. “These concerns shall not be a basis for failure to immediately return the child.” Id.
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birth parents have a longer period within which to exercise the right to revoke the consent to
adoption,170 but if the time for revocation has passed the consent to adoption becomes irrevocable,
even if the chosen adoptive parents later withdraw their petition to adopt or the petition to adopt is
denied.171 While the birth parents will be notified of any hearing on withdrawal of the petition to
adopt or on the department or agency recommendation that the petition be denied,172 they will not
have the right to regain custody of the child or revoke consent to adoption.173
The California provisions have the benefit of clarity and simplicity and they protect the
fundamental right of parents, even if that protection is limited. The limits in agency adoptions seem
reasonable, in that they have the right to identify the adoptive parents and only the prospective
adoptive parents identified by the birth parents have standing to file a petition for adoption.174 In
addition, birth parents have the right to revoke the relinquishment entirely or choose new adoptive
parents if the adoption by the originally selected adoptive parents is not completed. However, the
limited timeframe for revoking the relinquishment may be constitutionally objectionable.
On the other hand, independent adoptions provide parents with a longer period of time
within which to change their minds and revoke the placement agreement (thirty days).175 However,
once the agreement becomes irrevocable, birth parents have no opportunity to regain custody if
the chosen adoptive parents withdraw their petition to adopt or the court denies the petition.176
Moreover, birth parents have no right to choose new adoptive parents, which could arguably
violate their fundamental rights.
Constitutional rights recognized by California courts
California courts have expressly addressed the constitutional rights of parents, children,
and prospective adoptive parents in the adoption process.177 The courts have recognized that
parents have a compelling interest in “the companionship, care, custody and management” of their
children.178 In addition, children have “a fundamental independent interest in belonging to a
family unit” and “compelling rights to be protected from abuse and neglect and to have a placement
that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the
child.”179 Finally, “it is well established that a prospective adoptive parent with whom a child has
been placed for adoption has a liberty interest in continued custody.”180 While the courts recognize
the constitutional rights of birth parents, those rights are typically analyzed in the context of birth
parents challenging efforts to terminate their parental rights involuntarily or seeking to overturn

170

Tyler, 29 Cal. App. 4th at 535.
“The consent may not be revoked after a waiver of the right to revoke consent has been signed or after 30 days,
beginning on the date the consent was signed or as provided in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), whichever occurs
first.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814.5(b).
172
Id. §§ 8813, 8822.
173
“Notwithstanding the withdrawal or dismissal of the petition, the court may retain jurisdiction over the child
for the purposes of making any order for the child's custody that the court deems to be in the child's best interest.” Id.
§ 8804(b).
174
In re Michael R., 137 Cal. App. 4th at 136; CAL. FAM. CODE § 8704(b).
175
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814.5.
176
Id.
177
See, e.g., Adoption of Baby Boy D, 93 Cal. App. 4th 1 (2001).
178
Id. at 9-10 (quoting In re Marilyn H., 5 Cal.4th 295, 306 (1993)).
179
In re Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th at 306.
180
Adoption of Baby Girl B., 74 Cal.App.4th 43, 51 (1999).
171
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such orders. In those cases, the focus is on the constitutionality of the procedures involved in
terminating the parents’ rights and not on a substantive right to choose the adoptive parents.
The case of Adoption of Baby Boy D., involved an agency adoption in which the birth
mother, Delores, relinquished her child to Bethany Christian Services (Bethany), a licensed
adoption agency.181 Delores viewed profiles of prospective adoptive parents and chose the V’s as
her child’s adoptive parents on February 6.182 Delores gave birth to Baby Boy D on February 16.
On February 18, Delores signed a “Health Facility Minor Release Report” allowing the V’s to take
the baby home with them. Baby Boy D went home with the V’s that day.183
On February 19, in accordance with the California adoption statutes, a representative from
Bethany reviewed the necessary paperwork with Delores before she signed the required
relinquishment form.184 In addition to the relinquishment form, Delores read and signed a
statement of understanding (SOU) that was used by the department of social services (DSS) to
advise birth parents of the effect of signing the relinquishment and of the birth parent’s rights. 185
The first page of the SOU included a statement in bold typeface: “Before you Sign This Statement
of Understanding and the Relinquishment Document, Read Both Very Carefully with Your Social
Worker. Be Sure to Ask Questions About Anything You Do Not Understand.” 186 It further
informed birth parents:
Relinquishing a child means permanently giving the child to the adoption agency so
that the agency can choose other parents to adopt the child. . . . You will no longer
have any rights as a parent to your child once these documents have been filed with
the California Department of Social Services, Adoption Branch.187
The SOU also required the birth parent to initial the boxes next to twenty separate advisements
and statements, including statements regarding the birth parents’ right to an attorney, counseling,
notice of alternatives to adoption, and the right to have the adoption agency file the relinquishment
form immediately or hold it for thirty days before filing.188 Delores initialed nineteen of the
advisements and statements, but inadvertently failed to initial the box next to the last statement,
which read:
I have carefully thought about the reasons for keeping or giving up my child. I have
discussed the adoption plan of my child with the adoption agency, and I have decided
giving up my child to the agency for adoption is in the best interest of my child. I
have read and understand the Statement of Understanding and the relinquishment
document. I do not need any more help or time to make my decision. I have decided
to relinquish my child permanently to Bethany . . . for adoption and I am signing
this freely and willingly.189
Although she failed to initial the box, she signed the form less than an inch below that statement.190
Delores also signed a “Free Will Declaration” which stated that she made the decision to place her
181

Adoption of Baby Boy D., 93 Cal. App. 4th at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
183
Id. at 4.
184
Id. at 4. The relinquishment form had to be sent to and filed with the department of social services in order for
the relinquishment to be effective and irrevocable by Delores. Id. at 4-5; see Cal. Fam. Code § 8700(e).
185
Id. at 5.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 5.
188
Id. at 5-6.
189
Id. at 6.
190
Id.
182
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child with Bethany of her own free will and based on “full and complete” knowledge of her
options.191
Delores chose to have Bethany file the documents immediately, and—unaware of the empty
box on the SOU—Bethany forwarded the documents to DSS on February 21.192 DSS received the
Relinquishment on or about February 22, but refused to formally acknowledge the relinquishment
because of the missing initials in box 20 on the SOU.193 Instead, it immediately sent a denial of
acknowledgment to Bethany, requesting an affidavit from Delores regarding the missing initials.
Bethany sent an affidavit from the representative who had worked with Delores, but did not
immediately get an affidavit from Delores; that affidavit and a later affidavit from Bethany were
rejected by DSS, which insisted upon an affidavit from Delores.194 By this time, however, Delores
had changed her mind about the adoption and on April 11 she went to Bethany’s office to request
information on regaining custody of her child and presented a signed statement of revocation.195
The V’s filed an application to have the relinquishment declared valid and Delores filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. In the course of the litigation, Delores testified in her deposition
that she when she signed the SOU she “understood at that time that her rights to the child would be
terminated when the Relinquishment was filed with DSS,” she “understood that relinquishing the
child meant giving him up permanently for adoption,” and “she understood the meaning of each of
the advisements in the boxes she did initial and affirmed it was her intent that day to give up her
right of custody to the child.”196 She further acknowledged that the Bethany representative had
carefully discussed box 20 with her.197 Moreover, “Delores testified that she understood the
contents of box 20 and intended to initial box 20 at that time; Delores thought she had initialed box
20; it was merely an oversight she did not do so.”198 After a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the trial
court held that the relinquishment was defective and that DSS properly refused to acknowledge it
and ordered the child to be returned to Delores on a gradual basis. 199 The V’s appealed.200
The court of appeal noted that whether the relinquishment was valid was an issue of
statutory interpretation and involved consideration of the constitutional rights of the birth parent,
prospective adoptive parents, and the child, and held that the trial court should have conducted an
independent review of the facts to determine whether the relinquishment was valid.201 With respect
to Delores’ fundamental constitutional right to the care, custody, and management of her child, the
court noted that this right may be waived if the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently.202
“Given the rights at stake and the independent standard of review, we conclude that the court should
have done more than review the action of DSS and determine whether the Relinquishment was
complete; it should have determined whether the Relinquishment was valid (i.e., whether it was a
knowing, intelligent waiver of parental rights).”203 Moreover, the court concluded that the
191

Id.
Id. at 5-6.
193
Id. at 7.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 6.
197
Id. at 6
198
Id.
199
Id. at 9.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 10.
202
Id. (quoting In re Bridget R. 41 Cal.App.4th 1483 (1996)); see also Tyler, 29 Cal. App. 4th at 546
(“constitutional rights may generally be waived, provided the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent”).
203
Id. at 11.
192
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Relinquishment could be valid even if DSS refused to acknowledge it because of an error or
omission.204
In light of Delores’ admission that she intended to initial box 20, that her relinquishment
was knowing and voluntary that all of the statements in box 20 were true, the court of appeals
concluded that the relinquishment—even though incomplete—complied with the objective of
assuring voluntary and knowing decision making by birth parents.205 “To hold the Relinquishment
was not valid based on the failure to check one of 20 boxes would be an exaltation of form over
substance; something courts should seek to avoid.”206 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that
the relinquishment should have been declared valid by the trial court. 207 The court ordered DSS to
receive and acknowledge the relinquishment and to terminate Delores’ parental rights.208
Similarly, in Tyler v. Children’s Home Society of California,209 the court of appeals
addressed birth parents’ constitutional right to procedural due process in adoption proceedings. The
birth mother was an 18 year old college freshman who hid her pregnancy from her family, friends,
and roommates and gave birth unattended in her dormitory bathroom while her roommates slept in
the next room.210 The birth father was a freshman at another college.211 While he knew about the
pregnancy, he did not tell his friends or family either.212 The couple chose to place their daughter
for adoption using a licensed adoption agency.213 The agency representative who worked with the
birth parents encouraged the couple to consider keeping the baby and raising her or, alternatively,
informing their parents of the child’s birth before executing the relinquishment forms.214 Both
parents were adamant that their parents never find out about the pregnancy or the existence of the
baby.215 They chose prospective adoptive parents, signed the relinquishment forms, and elected to
have the forms filed immediately rather than held for thirty days.216 The relinquishment forms were
filed with DSS on May 7, 1991, thereby making it final and irrevocable by the birth parents absent
the consent of the adoption agency or proof of fraud or undue influence.217
In the fall of 1991, having told their parents about the baby and with their parents’
encouragement, the birth parents sought to rescind the relinquishment and regain custody of the
baby.218 The adoption agency refused to consent to the rescission, so the birth parents filed a
contract action seeking to rescind the relinquishment agreement on the grounds of fraud, coercion,
and undue influence.219 In addition, they identified procedural errors by the adoption agency in the
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Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 13-14.
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29 Cal. App. 4th 511 (1994).
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Id. at 522.
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Id.
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Id. at 524 note 5.
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Id. at 523.
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Id.
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Id. at 525.
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Id. at 525, 528.
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Id. at 525.
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relinquishment process and claimed that those errors rendered the relinquishments void.220 After a
three week trial the court found in favor of the adoption agency and upheld the relinquishments.221
Among the claims considered on appeal was the allegation that the agency’s admitted failure
to strictly adhere to the statutory and regulatory requirements regarding agency adoptions violated
the birth parents’ constitutional right to procedural due process.222 Although the court agreed with
birth parents that the adoption agency was a state actor for purposes of its due process analysis,223
and further affirmed parents’ “fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their
children,”224 it noted that constitutional rights—including parental rights—can be waived.225 “In
particular, constitutional rights to a parent-child relationship may be waived as long as the waivers
are ‘voluntary and knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.’”226 The court concluded that the procedures afforded to
the birth parents were adequate to ensure that their relinquishment of parental rights was knowing,
intelligent, and intelligent; consequently, they were constitutionally sufficient even if they deviate
from the statutory and regulatory provisions.227
While the courts in Baby Boy D. and Tyler expressly considered the constitutional rights of
the birth parents, they did not address the right to choose the adoptive parents. Instead, as is true in
most cases considering parents’ constitutional rights, the issue was the validity of the form or
procedures for terminating parents.228 Some cases allowing rescission due fraud, undue influence,
or duress do not even mention the birth parents’ constitutional rights. Instead, the discussions focus
on broader policy concerns,229 and courts may even rely on contract doctrine to evaluate fraud or
duress claims.230
In Hall v. Department of Adoptions, the birth mother sought to rescind her relinquishment
because she alleged that she “was unware of the consequences of her act of relinquishment because
of emotional distress which resulted from abuse by her husband; and that she was induced to sign
because of duress of her husband.”231 There was no allegation that the department of adoptions
knew of or was in any way complicit in the husband’s conduct.232 The court held that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action for fraud or duress.233
220

Id. at 527.
Id. at 526.
222
Id. at 544.
223
Id. at 545.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 545-46.
226
Id. at 546 (quoting San Diego County Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d. 1 (1972) (internal
citations omitted)).
227
Id. at 547.
228
See, e.g., Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, 851 P.2d 1307, 1315 (Cal. 1993) (holding that statutory procedure for
terminating parental rights “comports with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the precise
and demanding substantive and procedural requirements the petitioning agency must have satisfied before it can
propose termination are carefully calculated to constrain judicial discretion, diminish the risk of erroneous findings of
parental inadequacy and detriment to the child, and otherwise protect the legitimate interests of the parents.”).
229
See, e.g., Hall v. Dept. of Adoptions, 47 Cal. App. 3d 898, 902 (1975) (“The legislative purpose behind
[provisions making relinquishments final and irrevocable after filing unless consented to by the department or
adoption agency] is best served and the interests of the child are afforded the greatest recognition by giving continued
effect to relinquishments and consents to adoption.”).
230
See id.
231
Id. (emphasis in original).
232
Id.
233
Id. at 903.
221
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Even under rules permitting rescission of ordinary contracts, respondent’s original
complaint was insufficient in stating any cause of action against appellant. Duress
or fraud of a third party “renders a transaction voidable by a party induced thereby
to enter into it if the other party . . . has reason to know of the fraud . . . [or duress]
before he has given or promised in good faith something of value in the transaction
or changed his position materially by reason of the transaction . . . .”234
The court noted that the case involved “a matter of significantly greater importance than, for
example, the recovery of an amount of money under a contract,”235 but the birth mother’s
constitutional rights were never mentioned or considered.
Even in cases in which the parent’s objection to prospective adoptive parents is at issue, the
discussion typically focuses on the birth parents’ statutory rights and not constitutional rights. For
example, in In re Michael R., Tammy, the birth mother, relinquished her son to Nightlight Christian
Adoptions (NCA), a licensed adoption agency (an agency adoption) in November 2003.236 On the
relinquishment form, she named Sheryl and Roger M. as the prospective adoptive parents. 237 The
M.’s filed a petition to adopt the child in January 2004.238 In late August 2004, while the adoption
petition was still pending, Sheryl M. filed for divorce.239 The next month, NCA notified Tammy
that the M.’s were getting a divorce. Because one of Tammy’s desires was that her son be adopted
by a two-parent family, she submitted a formal written request to rescind her relinquishment to
NCS on September 30. Because the relinquishment was final, Tammy had no right to unilaterally
rescind the relinquishment.240 Sheryl M. filed a petition for temporary guardianship of the child on
October 25, which the court granted over Tammy’s objection.241 On November 2 NCS consented
to Tammy’s rescission of the relinquishment, but was unable to obtain physical custody of the child
because of the temporary guardianship.242
Sheryl M. petitioned to terminate Tammy’s parental rights and amended her adoption
petition to designate it as an independent adoption. Tammy moved to dismiss the petition alleging
that Sheryl lacked standing to file an independent adoption petition.243 The trial court held that
Tammy had a right to her child after the relinquishment was rescinded and dismissed Sheryl M.’s
petition to adopt for lack of standing.244 On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court’s holdings.245
While the court of appeals discussed the statutory procedures for agency and independent adoptions
in significant detail, at no point did the court mention Tammy’s constitutional rights as a parent.
Indeed, it was clear that Tammy’s right to rescind her relinquishment was dependent upon a statute
allowing rescission only with the consent of the adoption agency once the relinquishment has
become final.246 Thus, the court did not consider whether birth parents have a constitutional right
to rescind relinquishments or revoke consent to an independent adoption if the prospective adoptive
234

Id. (quoting Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal.2d 195, 206 ())
Id. at 904.
236
In re Michael R., 137 Cal. App. 4th at 132.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8700(e).
241
Id. at 132-33.
242
Id. at 133.
243
Id. at 134-35.
244
Id. at 135. Sheryl did not come within the class of persons designated to have standing under the statute.
245
Id. at 136-138.
246
“A relinquishment that has been filed may be rescinded only with the mutual consent of the licensed adoption
agency and the birth parent or parents relinquishing the child.” Id. at 137 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 8700(e)).
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parents omit facts about themselves that would make them unsuitable to the birth parents, or if the
circumstances in the home of the prospective adoptive parents change after the child is placed in
their home (through divorce, death of one prospective adoptive parent, or birth of a child).247 While
setting reasonable limits on a parent’s right to revoke a relinquishment does not violate their
constitutional rights, when the birth parent has been misled by the prospective adoptive parents, an
exception to the general rule may be necessary. Applying precedent allowing rescission for fraud
may be sufficient to protect parents’ constitutional rights under those circumstances.
IV.

The Indian Child Welfare Act

Federal law poses a potential challenge to parents’ constitutional rights in the adoption
context if the child meets the definition of an “Indian child” under the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 (ICWA).248 The ICWA was enacted to strengthen Indian249 families and provide additional
protection for parents of Indian children in response to alarming numbers of Indian children being
removed from Indian families and placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes.250
During Congressional hearings that led to enactment of the ICWA, experts testified that
many state officials who made determinations about the fate of Indian children were ignorant about
or contemptuous of Native American culture and customs.251 The Congressional findings in the
first section of the ICWA reflect concerns about these practices.
Recognizing the special relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes
and their members and the Federal responsibility to Indian people, the Congress
finds . . . that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the
removal, often unwarranted, of their children; . . . [and] that the States, exercising
their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings . . . have often
failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural
and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.252
One prominent example was the custom of Indian children spending substantial time in the care
of extended family members, sharing resources and childrearing responsibilities.253 Non-Indian
social workers viewed such arrangements as neglect by the biological parents and too often
removed the children from their families and the tribe.254 In fact, there was testimony that twentyfive to thirty-five percent of all Indian children were in foster care, adoptive homes, or
institutions,255 and that over ninety percent of Indian children who were adopted were placed with
247

See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8700, 8815(a).
25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. The Indian Child Welfare Act defines “Indian child” to mean “any unmarried person
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(4). “‘Indian child's tribe’ means
(a) the Indian tribe in which an Indian child is a member or eligible for membership or (b), in the case of an Indian
child who is a member of or eligible for membership in more than one tribe, the Indian tribe with which the Indian
child has the more significant contacts.” Id. § 1903(5).
249
The term “Indian” is used in this discussion to be consistent with the language in the ICWA and cases
discussing its application and interpretation.
250
See id. §§ 1901, 1902.
251
Kelsey Vujnich, A Brief Overview of the Indian Child Welfare Act, State Court Responses, and Actions Taken
in the Past Decade to Improve Implementation Outcomes, 26 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 183, 185-86 (2013)
252
25 U.S.C. § 1901(4).
253
Id. at 186.
254
Id.
255
See Vujnich supra note 251 at 186 (citing 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7513).
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non-Indian families.256 The staggering number of children being removed from Indian families
and the resulting decimation of tribes led to passage of the ICWA.257
The ICWA was intended to protect Indian families and provide greater protection to parents
of Indian children in child custody proceedings, including voluntary parental right termination
cases.258 The protection is accomplished by giving tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over child
custody proceedings involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled on the tribe’s
reservation259 and—absent objection by a parent—requires state courts to transfer proceedings to
the tribal court upon the petition of any parent, Indian custodian, or the Indian child’s tribe. 260 In
addition, an Indian child’s custodian and the Indian child’s tribe have the right to intervene at any
time in any state court proceeding for foster care placement, or termination of the parental rights of
an Indian child.261 In addition to jurisdictional provisions, the ICWA establishes procedures that
must be followed and grants substantive rights to parents in cases involving voluntary foster care
placements and parental right termination and adoption proceedings.262
In some respects, the ICWA gives parents greater authority in adoption proceedings than
they would have under state law. The clearest example is the parent’s right to withdraw consent to
adoption at any time prior to entry of a final adoption decree, at which point the child must be
returned to the parent.263 However, with respect to choosing adoptive parents the ICWA poses a
significant obstacle. The statute establishes a preference that state and tribal courts must follow
when placing Indian children for adoption.
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be
given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a
member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child's
tribe; or (3) other Indian families.264
256

Cheyanna L. Jaffke, Judicial Indifference: Why Does the "Existing Indian Family" Exception to the Indian
Child Welfare Act Continue to Endure? 38 W. ST. U. L. REV. 127, 130 (2011).
257
See Vujnich supra note 251 at 187 (noting that Congress passed ICWA in response to concerns that the “very
existence of Indian tribes in America was at risk due to the alarmingly high number of children being placed with nonIndian families”).
258
“The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children
and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal
standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive
homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture . . . .” 25 U.S.C. § 1902. See also § 1903 (giving the
Indian child’s tribe the right to intervene in any state court proceeding for the termination of parental rights).
259
Id. § 1911(a). There is an exception for cases in which federal law grants jurisdiction to the state, but that
exception does not apply if the Indian child is a ward of a tribal court. Id.
260
Id. § 1911(b). The tribe can choose to decline the request to transfer. Id.
261
Id. § 1911(c).
262
Id. § 1913 (requiring consent to foster care placement or termination of parental rights to be in writing and
recorded before a judge and no less than 10 days after the birth of the child; allowing parents or Indian custodians of
Indian children to withdraw consent to foster placement at any time and requiring return of the child to the parent or
Indian custodian; allowing any parent of an Indian child to withdraw consent to termination of parental rights or
adoptive placement at any time before final adoption decree is entered).
263
“In any voluntary proceeding for termination of parental rights to, or adoptive placement of, an Indian child,
the consent of the parent may be withdrawn for any reason at any time prior to the entry of a final decree of termination
or adoption, as the case may be, and the child shall be returned to the parent.” 25 U.S.C.A. § 1913(c). Parents also
have an absolute right to prevent the case from being transferred to tribal court. § 1911(b).
264
25 U.S.C.A. § 1915(a). It should be noted that the ICWA gives preference to the Indian child’s “extended
family,” which, on its face, would include non-Indian family members. Thus, the law does not appear to require
preferring Indian family members over non-Indian family members. § 1915(b)(i). See also § 1903(2) (“extended
family member” shall be as defined by the law or custom of the Indian child's tribe or, in the absence of such law or
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Tribes may establish a different order or preference, which state agencies and courts must
follow.265 Parents have no right to choose adoptive parents under the express language of the
ICWA; indeed, it does not even require consideration of the parent’s wishes in every case.266
Instead, the ICWA merely states that “[w]here appropriate, the preference of the Indian
child or parent shall be considered.”267 The statute gives no indication when it is “appropriate” to
“consider” (but not necessarily give any weight to) the preferences of the parent. Consequently,
the parent of an Indian child may be forced to choose between keeping the child and raising him
or her even when the parent believes that adoption would be in the child’s best interests, or
allowing the child to be adopted by parents chosen in accordance with the ICWA’s provisions,
even when the parent believes that the placement is not in the child’s best interests. Putting parents
in this position violates their constitutional rights under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.268
Several states have held that parental preference for a non-Indian adoptive family is “good
cause” to deviate from the ICWA placement preference hierarchy.269 While the ICWA does not
define or describe what factors should be considered when deciding whether “good cause” exists,
the regulations published by the Bureau of Indian Affairs lists three factors: (1) the placement
preference of the biological parents or the child; (2) any “extraordinary physical or emotional needs
of the child;”; and (3) unavailability of families for placement consistent with the ICWA’s
preference list.270 Because these factors are part of the regulations and not the statute, courts have
treated them as advisory and not mandatory.271
In In re N.N.E., the Iowa Supreme Court considered the state ICWA statute as well as the
federal version of the ICWA. The birth mother, Shannon, was a member of the Tyme Maidu Tribe
of the Berry Creek Rancheria, a federally recognized Indian tribe located in California.272 Shannon
was living in Iowa when she became pregnant in 2005 and chose to give the child up for
adoption.273 The child was eligible for membership in Shannon’s tribe and, therefore, was an
Indian child within the meaning of the Iowa and federal versions of the ICWA.274 Although both
the Iowa and federal ICWA preference provisions required the Iowa court to attempt placement
with extended family member, members of the child’s tribe, another Indian family, or a non-Indian
family approved by the child’s tribe,275 Shannon chose a non-Indian family to adopt her child and
gave the child to them three days after the child was born. 276 The tribe intervened in the action to
custom, shall be a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child's grandparent, aunt or uncle,
brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent;”). However,
the remaining parties on the list of preferences are all foster homes or institutions that are approved by the Indian tribe.
Moreover, the tribe can change the preference order such that extended family members could be considered only in
the absence of Indian families or members of the Indian tribe are unable or unwilling to adopt the child. § 1915(c).
265
Id. § 1915(c).
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
The ICWA has also been challenged on other constitutional grounds, including the Equal Protection grounds.
269
See, e.g., In re N.N.E., 752 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2008); In re Adoption of Keith M.W., 79 P.3d 623, 630-31
(Alaska 2003);
270
In re Adoption of B.G.J., 133 P.3d 1 (2006) (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 (Nov. 1979)).
271
In re. N.N.E., 752 N.W.2d at 7 (describing guidelines as “nonbinding”)’ In re Adoption of Keith M.W., 79 P.3d
at 626 (“the guidelines are only persuasive and are neither exclusive nor binding”).
272
In re. N.N.E., 752 N.W.2d at 4.
273
Id.
274
Id. at 7.
275
Id. at 9; 25 U.S.C.A. § 1911; IOWA CODE § 232B.9(1).
276
In re N.N.E., 752 N.W.2d at 4.
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terminate her parental rights and gave notice of its intent to “exercise its right to preferred
placement if Shannon relinquishe[d] her parental rights.”277
The trial court ultimately terminated Shannon’s parental rights and the tribe appealed the
termination order as well as the order appointing a guardian for the child. The tribe alleged multiple
violations of the Iowa and federal ICWA. The appellees (including the child’s appointed guardian,
Shannon, and the child’s guardian ad litem) argued that the trial court complied with the state and
federal statutes and, alternatively, that the Iowa ICWA was unconstitutional “to the extent that it
allows a tribe to interfere with a private adoption.”
The Iowa Supreme Court held that the Iowa ICWA was unconstitutional because it did not
allow courts to deviate from the statutory placement preferences when a parent objected or
requested placement with a family that was not in the list of preferred adoptees.278 Instead, parental
requests could not be a basis for disregarding the statutory preferences unless the objecting party
could prove by clear and convincing evidence that such a placement “would be harmful to the
Indian child.”279 The Iowa Supreme Court found:
Assuming survival of the tribe is a compelling state interest, the Iowa ICWA
preferred placement provisions as they apply to voluntary termination of parental
rights violate due process because they are not narrowly tailored. The statute makes
the rights of a tribe paramount to the rights of an Indian parent or child where, as
in this case, the parent who is the tribal member has no connection to the reservation
and has not been deemed unfit to parent. Shannon’s fundamental right to make
decisions concerning the care of her child is not lessened because she intended to
terminate her rights to [her child]. . . . . The State has no right to influence her
decision [whether to place her child for adoption] by preventing her from choosing
a family she feels is best suited to raise her child.280
Because the Iowa ICWA was unconstitutional, the court held that the federal ICWA placement
preferences should be applied and remanded for that purpose.281 The federal statute did not suffer
from the same constitutional infirmity as the Iowa version because it allowed courts to deviate
from the statutory placement preferences for “good cause” and the request of a parent to place the
child with someone outside of the statutory preference order has been held to be good cause.282
The Supreme Court of Kansas upheld a trial court’s determination that good cause existed
to place an Indian child with a non-Indian family in contravention of the ICWA placement
preferences when the tribe failed to offer “suitable placements” for the child and the biological
mother was adamant that members of her extended family not be allowed to raise her child.283
“She knew and considered members of her extended Indian family for placement and consciously
rejected them . . . .”284 Likewise the Supreme Court of Alaska upheld trial court find of good cause

277

Id. at 5.
Id. at 8.
279
Id. (quoting IOWA CODE § 232B.9(6)).
280
Id. at 9 (internal citation omitted). The court also noted the biological parent’s unqualified right under Iowa
and federal ICWA to withdraw their consent to the termination of parental rights at any time before a final adoption
decree is entered. Id. at 9.
281
Id. at 9.
282
Id. at 8-9 (citing Bureau of Indian Affairs guidelines listing the request of the biological parents as a proper
consideration when determining whether good cause exists not to follow the order of preference in the federal ICWA).
283
In re Adoption of B.G.J., 133 P.3d at 5.
284
Id.
278
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to deviate from the statutory preferences when the request of the biological mother was a
“pivotal”—but not the only—factor considered by the court.285
Greater recognition of the constitutional rights of biological parents’ right to place their
Indian children in non-Indian adoptive homes has been met with resistance by some tribes and
ICWA advocates. Many scholars and concerned advocates have decried state court resistance to
the ICWA and, in particular, judicially created exceptions to the ICWA.286 Much of the objection
has been aimed at the “existing Indian family” exception that has been applied by some courts287
and courts that have applied a “best interests of the child” inquiry when deciding whether “good
cause” exists to refuse to transfer proceedings to tribal courts 288 or to deviate from the placement
preference order in the ICWA.289 The constitutional rights of parents of Indian children has been
litigated and discussed in scholarly literature with less frequency but equal passion.
Both courts and scholars have cited the language in Holyfield v. Mississippi Bank of
Choctaw to support interpreting ICWA as elevating the rights and interests of the tribe over those
of individual parents.290 In Holyfield, parents who were enrolled members of the Choctaw Indian
tribe and who were domiciled on the tribal reservation attempted to place their twin newborns for
adoption with a non-Indian couple.291 The mother gave birth approximately 200 miles away from
the reservation and both parents executed consent-to-adoption forms in the county where she gave
birth.292 The babies were placed with the Holyfields, a non-Indian couple, who filed a petition for
adoption soon after.293 The state court entered a final adoption decree in favor of the Holyfields
In re Adoption of Keith M.W., 79 P.3d 623, 630 (Alaska 2003). The court also considered the child’s emotional
bond with the non-Indian adoptive parents and the fact that the adoptive parents chosen by the biological mother
agreed to an “open” adoption that would allow her to have contact with the child and could “assist [the adoptive
parents] in attending to [the child’s] cultural identity.” Id.
286
See, e.g., Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New
Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587 (2002) (arguing for amendment of the ICWA because
state courts created their own definitions of key terms in the ICWA and find it inapplicable on the facts in order to
retain jurisdiction); Jeanne Louis Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction, and the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585 (1994) (exploring “how the cultural construction of the Native American
operates in the emerging law of concurrent jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and perpetuates
the subordination of Native American culture, families, and individuals—a subordination that the Act ostensibly
counters”).
287
See Atwood, supra note 286 at 588 (“some state courts have found the Act inapplicable under the ‘existing
Indian family’ exception”). “If a child or the child’s parents are found to have insufficient ties to the Indian tribe
attempting to intervene in a child custody proceeding, some state courts have held that the ICWA does not apply,
reasoning that in such cases, ICWA’s state goal of ‘promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes and families’
is not met.” Jennifer Nutt Carleton, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Study in the Codification of the Ethnic Best
Interests of the Child, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 21, 31 (1997).
288
See Carriere, supra note 286 at 615-616 (noting that the high courts of Montana, Indiana, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota, along with the California Court of Appeals, have held that courts can find good cause to refuse to transfer
jurisdiction under § 1911(b) based on the best interests of the child).
289
See Carleton, supra note 287 at 30 (noting that some courts have found that the best interests of the child is
“good cause” to not follow the order of preference in § 1915(a)).
290
See Donna J. Goldsmith, INDIVIDUAL VS. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, 13 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 7 (1990). “Holyfield clarifies the competing interests among mother, child, and tribe, and recognizes
that these interests must be prioritized according to tribal custom.” Id. Goldsmith argues that “tribal communities
prioritize these competing interests differently than many Anglo feminists would, placing emphasis on the child’s and
the tribal community’s interests.” Id.
291
490 U.S. 30 (1989).
292
Id. at 37-38.
293
Id. at 30, 38.
285
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less than three weeks later.294 Two months after the decree was entered, the Choctaw tribe moved
to vacate the adoption decree on the ground that the ICWA gave the tribe exclusive jurisdiction
over the adoption proceedings since the parents and children were domiciled on the reservation.295
The state court overruled the motion and the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed, holding that
the babies were never domiciled on tribal land, thus the tribe did not have exclusive jurisdiction.296
The courts relied on the fact that the parents deliberately chose to have the babies born outside of
tribal land and the babies had never resided or been physically present on the reservation.297
The United States Supreme Court reversed, noting that it was undisputed that that the
parents were domiciled on the Choctaw reservation at the time of the babies’ birth
(notwithstanding their departure shortly before the birth) and, for purposes of the ICWA, the babies
were also domiciled on the reservation.298 The Court further noted that the parents’ desire to avoid
tribal jurisdiction was irrelevant.299
Tribal jurisdiction under § 1911(a) was not meant to be defeated by the actions of
individual members of the tribe, for Congress was concerned not solely about the
interests of the Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes
themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians. . . . The
numerous prerogatives accorded the tribes through the ICWA’s substantive
provisions . . . must, accordingly, be seen as a means of protecting not only the
interests of individual children and families, but also of the tribes themselves.300
Although the opinion considered only proper jurisdiction and parents’ attempts to unilaterally
defeat tribal jurisdiction, this language has been cited in support of a broader argument favoring
tribal interests over the rights of parents.301
In her article discussing the feminist arguments against and in support of allowing tribes to
place children in Indian homes against the wishes of their Indian mothers, Donna J. Goldsmith
explains how different cultural norms can justify subordinating individual rights and elevating the
interests and rights of the tribe.302
The Supreme Court has held that the right to raise one’s children is considered an
essential and basic civil right. In addition the primary role of parents in the
upbringing of their children is well ensconced in Anglo tradition. In contrast, many
American Indians perceive themselves as part of the larger cultural group, not as
completely autonomous individuals. Every child belongs to both its ‘nuclear’
family and to the tribe. Prior to the arrival of Anglo-Europeans in North America,
an orphaned child was virtually unheard of in Indian tribal societies. The concept
that a mother has the right to remove her child from its extended family and
community, thereby depriving the child of its heritage, and the community of its
valued member, is foreign to American Indian cultures.303
294

Id.
Id.
296
Id. at 39.
297
Id.
298
Id. at 48-49. “Since most minors are legally incapable of forming the requisite intent to establish a domicile,
their domicile is determined by that of their parents.” Id. at 48.
299
Id. at 49
300
Id. at 49.
301
Goldsmith, supra note 290 at 7.
302
Id. at 2, 7.
303
Id. at 7-8.
295
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This concept of the tribe’s collective interests as prioritized above (or at least equal to) those of
the individual members of the tribe support interpreting the ICWA as allowing tribes and state
courts to follow the ICWA placement order even if the parent requests a different placement.
However, there are problems with that analysis and application of the ICWA. First, it
assumes that Indians have no power to reject Indian cultural norms and embrace Anglo norms, at
least with respect to how their children will be raised. While the member may leave the tribe, the
tribe chooses the fate of the members’ children. The tribe alone decides whether a child is eligible
for membership and may exercise jurisdiction and impose its values on the child without regard to
the wishes of the parents or the child.304 Not only is the child of a member subject to tribal
jurisdiction and laws that protect the tribe’s interests, but so is the grandchild and perhaps greatgrandchild, depending on the will of the tribe and their criteria for membership. In this way,
members are completely and irrevocably bound by tribal custom and their rights as citizens of the
United States would be likewise curtailed. While it is reasonable to believe that Congress intended
for members of the tribe to be allowed to decide custody issues for members who choose to be a
part of the Indian community and live in accordance with the values and interests of that
community, it is far less clear that Congress intended for those interests and values to trump the
rights and values of those who choose not to be a part of the community.
Second, it would apply to non-Indian parents who do not share—and have never shared—
the Indian culture’s notion of children belonging to the tribe. Infringing on the rights of non-Indian
parents because of Indian cultural beliefs and interests cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
While Goldsmith’s explication of tribal values may be correct, that does not mean that Congress
intended or even had the authority to enact legislation that would strip parents—Indian and nonIndian—of their constitutional rights when those rights conflict with the values or interests of
Indian tribes. “The power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it is not
absolute.”305
The standard of review generally applied to laws infringing on fundamental rights is strict
scrutiny, which requires those laws to be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government
interest.306 As noted above, the ICWA cannot meet this standard. While preserving Indian culture
and, in particular, Indian tribes and families is a compelling interest, interpreting the ICWA to
infringe on the rights of parents (especially those who may have only tenuous or no ties to Indian
culture) is not necessary or narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Its application is even more
objectionable when applied to non-Indian parents. A non-Indian mother is deprived of her
fundamental rights for the benefit of a culture with which she has no personal ties. Her culture and
values are completely disregarded as irrelevant or at least subordinate to those of the tribe. While
individual rights may be foreign to Indian culture, they are the bedrock of American culture as
evidenced by our founding and governing documents and hundreds of years of precedent. Indian
and non-Indian parents are entitled to embrace those rights and to expect courts to enforce them.
“Indian” means any person who is a member of an Indian tribe, or who is an Alaska Native and a member of
a Regional Corporation as defined in section 1606 of Title 43; “Indian child” means any unmarried person who is
under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe; “Indian child's tribe” means (a) the Indian tribe in which an
Indian child is a member or eligible for membership or (b), in the case of an Indian child who is a member of or
eligible for membership in more than one tribe, the Indian tribe with which the Indian child has the more significant
contacts. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(3)-(5).
305
United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946); Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks,
30 U.S. 73, 84 (1977).
306
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
304
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Notwithstanding the fundamental rights at issue, it must be noted the Supreme Court has
applied a lower standard of review in several cases involving Equal Protection and Due Process
challenges to laws that give preferences to Indians over non-Indians or some Indian tribes and not
others.307 “On numerous occasions this Court specifically has upheld legislation that singles out
Indians for particular and special treatment. . . . As long as the special treatment can be tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative
judgments will not be disturbed.”308 In Morton, the Court held that the statute giving preference to
qualified Indians for employment in the Bureau of Indian Affairs was “reasonable and rationally
designed to further Indian self-government” and therefore the classification did not violate due
process.309 In Weeks, the court applied the lower standard of review and found no equal protection
violation when a congressional act distributed funds to some groups of Indians but not others.310
However, neither Morton nor Weeks involved fundamental rights of those challenging
congressional action. Thus, application of the lower standard in ICWA cases is not a foregone
conclusion. But the strongest argument in favor of heightened review and protecting parents’
constitutional rights is found in the text of the ICWA itself:
In any case where State or Federal law applicable to a child custody proceeding
under State or Federal law provides a higher standard of protection to the rights of
the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child than the rights provided under this
subchapter, the State or Federal court shall apply the State or Federal standard.311
This provision should be understood to recognize that parents have fundamental rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and those rights provide a higher
standard of protection to parents in cases involving voluntary terminations of parental rights in
general, and specifically with respect to the biological parent’s right to choose adoptive parents
for their children.312 According to the ICWA, this higher standard of protection should be applied
and the constitutional rights of parents should be protected.
The ICWA can be enforced as written in a way that does not violate parents’ right to choose
adoptive parents. Courts need only hold that good cause exists as a matter of law to deviate from
ICWA’s placement preference order whenever the biological parent chooses adoptive parents that
do not conform to the statutory preference order. Not only would a finding of good cause in that
situation be consistent with federal guidelines, it respects the constitutional rights of biological
parents to direct the custody, care, and upbringing of their children.313

307

See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (upholding provision in Indian Reorganization Act that included
an employment preference for qualified Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs); Delaware Tribal Business Committee
v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
308
Morton, 417 U.S. at 554-555.
309
Id. at 555.
310
Weeks, 430 U.S. at 73.
311
25 U.S.C.A. § 1921.
312
Note that this does not require embracing the “existing Indian family doctrine” since the parental choice
presumption would apply even if there is an existing Indian family.
313
See In re N.N.E., 752 N.W.2d at 8; Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
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Conclusion
Fit parents who choose to place their children for adoption are endowed with the same
fundamental constitutional rights as other parents, and that includes the right to make decisions
regarding the care, custody, and upbringing of those children. Consequently, allowing those
parents to choose the adoptive parents who will raise their children is not a mere courtesy; it is a
recognition of those rights. While the power to choose adoptive parents is not absolute and must
be balanced against the right of the child to be raised in an environment free of abuse or neglect
and the state’s interest in protecting children from those dangers, states must afford great deference
to the parents’ choice and overrule it only when their chosen prospective adoptive parents fail to
meet the minimum standards applicable to all adoption petitioners. State and federal laws or
policies that fail to give sufficient deference to the wishes of the parents are unconstitutional and
cannot stand.
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